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Abstract
Resource purchasing funds have become a major tool for environmental protection and
resource conservation.  These funds use various strategies to target resources for environmental
conservation, the choice of which may lead to striking differences in environmental performance.
This paper develops an analytical framework to compare the effects of alternative targeting
strategies on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and environmental benefits.  We demonstrate
that ignoring the output price effect of purchasing funds reduces environmental gain from the
purchasing fund and, in some cases, may make a purchasing fund counterproductive.  A
purchasing strategy that targets resources with the highest environmental benefits may be
counterproductive even if the price feedback effect is recognized.  This strategy, however, will
have the smallest impact on output price and overall resource use among all strategies considered
and should be favored by consumers and input providers.  A strategy that targets low-cost
resources will result in the largest reduction in production and the largest output price increase,
and should be favored by resource owners.  A strategy that targets resources with the highest
benefit-to-cost ratio is efficient and provides the largest environmental benefits for a given budget
when the output demand is perfectly elastic.  This strategy, however, no longer maximizes total
environmental benefit for a given budget when output demand is not perfectly elastic, and should
not be the most preferred strategy of any group.  We argue that the optimal design of targeting
criteria must consider the price feedback effect.
Keywords: conservation funds, distributional effects, environmental benefits, targeting strate-
gies.
JEL classification: D1, D2.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF
CONSERVATION TARGETING STRATEGIES
“You want to save the environment?  Buy it!”
Ted Turner’s commencement address,
College of Natural Resources,
U. C. Berkeley, 1996.
Resource purchasing funds have become a major tool for environmental protection and
resource conservation.  Total federal expenditures on resource conservation and environmental
programs were estimated to be $6.7 billion in fiscal year 1996 ([22], p. 264).  Examples of
purchasing funds abound.  A major reform of U.S. agricultural policy in 1996 was the transforma-
tion of the Conservation Reserve Program from a supply control program to a conservation fund
with a current annual budget of over $1.8 billion.  More than $15 billion was spent on the pro-
gram from 1987 to 1996.  Recently, the U.S. government purchased the prime forestland in the
Headwaters of California, with an acquisition cost of $480 million.  The federal Central Valley
Project Improvement Act passed in 1992 established a purchasing fund with an annual budget of
$60 million to divert water from agricultural production to enhance stream flows in the Central
Valley of California.  National park systems around the world are often established by purchasing
“crown jewel” tracts of land.  Debt for nature swaps are becoming an increasingly popular
method of preserving biodiversity in developing countries.  The Nature Conservancy has pro-
tected 9.5 million acres of environmentally valuable land and manages 1,500 preserves in the
United States.
Existing conservation funds do not use identical strategies for targeting purchases.1  The
Conservation Reserve Program enrolled land based mainly on cost before 1992 [12, 21].  This
strategy maximizes the amount of the resource acquired (land or water) regardless of
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environmental value.  Benefit targeting acquires resources with the highest per-unit
environmental value regardless of the per-unit cost.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service tends to
target wetlands and other water resources based primarily on biological criteria.  Benefit-cost
targeting obtains resources according to the ratio of environmental benefit to economic cost.
There is a growing tendency to employ this criterion in environmental purchasing activities.2
Choice of a targeting strategy for a conservation fund may be determined by both political
and economic considerations.3  Several interest groups are potentially affected by conservation
funds, including resource owners, consumers, and environmentalists.  As purchasing funds
become more widely used, the question naturally arises as to which targeting scheme will be
preferred by affected groups.  Should environmentalists prefer benefit targeting?  Should resource
owners prefer cost targeting?  Should consumers prefer benefit-cost targeting?
In this paper, we attempt to address these questions by comparing the effects of alternative
targeting strategies on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and environmental benefits.  Our
framework assumes a heterogeneous resource base where resource units have a joint distribution
of fixed coefficients of output and environmental benefit.  This assumption was used by
Houthaker [12] and Johansen [13] to provide the theoretical foundation for aggregate neoclassical
production functions and was expanded by Hochman and Zilberman [11], Just and Antle [14],
and Opaluch and Segerson [16] to environmental policy analysis.4  Consistent with these studies,
we abstract from information problems and assume that the policymaker has full information
about resource productivity and environmental benefits.5  The increased availability of detailed
micro-level data combined with GIS techniques make this approach empirically tractable and it
has been applied in recent policy debates.6
We demonstrate that groups differ in their preference ordering of the conservation strategies.
Producers should prefer cost targeting; consumers, labor and input suppliers should prefer benefit
targeting; and environmental groups should prefer benefit-cost targeting when output demand is
perfectly elastic.  We consider price feedback effects associated with inelastic output demand.
This feedback reduces the effectiveness of the purchasing fund and may change the preference of
environmentalists over benefit or benefit-cost targeting.  We show that when output demand is
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not perfectly elastic benefit-cost targeting no longer maximizes total environmental benefits for a
given budget.  We obtain conditions under which ignoring the feedback from increased output
price leads to an overall decline in environmental quality and argue that optimal design of
purchasing strategies should incorporate output market considerations.
The next section discusses alternative targeting strategies for conservation funds. Section 3
compares the economic, environmental, and distributional effects of these strategies for the case
of fixed output price.  Section 4 considers the “slippage” of environmental benefits associated
with the output price increase.  Section 5 derives the targeting criterion that maximizes total
environmental benefit when output demand is not perfectly elastic.  Section 6 compares the
performance of all targeting strategies for the case of inelastic output demand.  Section 7
concludes the paper with a discussion of the results.
Targeting Strategies
Consider a competitive industry producing an output using a resource that also generates
environmental benefit.  The quality of the resource is differentiated by the output and
environmental benefit per unit of resource, both of which are assumed to be fixed (the putty-clay
assumption).  Let y be output per unit of resource, and let b be the environmental benefit per unit
of resource if the resource is preserved.  Let s(y, b) be the resource distribution function, where y
varies from 0 to y and b varies from 0 to b .   Production cost per unit of resource is assumed
constant and is denoted by c.  In many cases the resource is land and y is output unit of land, and
b is the environmental benefit provided by one unit of land when it is removed from production.
For example, b may represent biodiversity benefit or reduction in soil erosion.
The difficulty of accurately measuring the social value of environmental benefits creates a
formidable obstacle to determining the optimal budget.7  Governments in many cases set a
budget for the purchasing fund and then design a criterion for targeting resources for purchase.  In
this paper we accommodate this procedure and consider four popular targeting criteria under a
given budget.  Let i be an index of the targeting criteria, with i = 0 representing the resource
situation before the establishment of the conservation fund.  Cost targeting (i = 1) purchases the
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least expensive resources.  Benefit targeting (i = 2) purchases the resources with the highest
environmental benefit, regardless of cost.  Benefit-cost targeting (i = 3) purchases resources with
the highest ratio of environmental benefit to economic cost.  Benefit-maximizing targeting (i = 4)
maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget.
Each targeting strategy corresponds to selecting a subset of (y, b) from the base resource set
R y b y y b bº £ £ £ £{( , ); ; } 0  0 .  Let X be a subset of R.  The total number of resource units in
X is
( ) ( , )
X
Q X s y b dydb= òò . (1)
The total output Y X( )  and the total environmental benefit B X( ) are
( ) ( , )     and      ( ) ( , )
X X
Y X ys y b dydb B X bs y b dydb= =òò òò . (2)
Short-term profit or quasi-rent from using the resource is
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
X
X py c s y b dydb pY X cQ XP = - = -òò , (3)
where p is output price. To compare the economic and environmental impacts of alternative
targeting strategies, it is important to identify both the resources in production and resources in
conservation under each of these strategies.
Let Ui be the set of resources ((y, b) combinations) in production under strategy i.8
U U Ui i
ru
i
acº + (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), (4)
where U i
ru  is the set of reused resources —  resources utilized both before and after the
introduction of the conservation fund, and U i
ac  is the set of activated resources —  previously idle
resources to be used in production after the establishment of the conservation fund because of the
resulting output price increase.
Let Ii be the set of resources in conservation under strategy i.
I I I Ii i
rt
i
rn
i
lpº + + (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), (5)
where Ii
rt  is the set of retired resources —  previously utilized resources purchased by the
fund, Ii
rn  is the set of retained resources —  previously idle resources purchased by the fund,
which would be used in production if not purchased because of the output price increase, and Ii
lp
is the set of low productivity resources —  resources in preservation both before and after the
introduction of the conservation fund.
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By using these notations and the functions defined by equations (1) through (3), the number
of resource units in production under strategy i is Q Ui( ),9  and the number of resource units in
conservation under strategy i is Q Ii( ) .  The key performance measures for strategy comparison
are: i) aggregate output Y Y Ui i= ( ) ; ii) aggregate short-term profit from production P Pi iU= ( ) ;
iii) total producer surplus from both production and the conservation fund
PS U U I Ii i
ru
i
ac
i
rt
i
rn= + + +P( ) = +P i M ; iv) consumer surplus CSi; v) total environmental
benefit B B Ii i= ( ) ; and vi) the net gain in environmental benefit DB B I B Ui irt iacº -( ) ( ) .  If
DBi < 0 , the conservation fund is said to be counterproductive.  In the next section, we compare
the performance of the four targeting strategies, assuming output price is fixed.
Comparing Targeting Strategies: Fixed Output Price
When output demand is perfectly elastic, output price is not affected by the purchasing fund
(i.e., p p p p1 2 3 0= = = ), and no idle resources will be activated by the conservation fund (i.e.,
U i
ac = 0, Ii
rn = 0 , and I y b y c pilp = <{( , ); } 0  for all i).  In this case, benefit-cost targeting maxi-
mizes total environmental benefit for a given budget (i.e., it becomes identical to benefit-maxi-
mizing targeting).
Suppose the conservation fund is operated under full information, and resource owners will
divert the resource from production if offered the opportunity cost in production.  Under cost
targeting (i = 1), there is a critical output level y *  such that all resources with output lower than
y *  will be preserved.  Thus, the retired resources under this strategy are
I y b c p y yrt1 0= £ <{( , ); *} , (6)
where y *  is defined by P( )I Grt1 = , and G  is the total budget of the conservation fund.  Reused
resources under cost targeting are
U y b y yru1 = ³{( , ); *} . (7)
Under benefit targeting (i = 2), there is a critical level of environmental benefit b*  such that
all utilized resources with b b> *  will be diverted from production.  Thus, retired resources under
this strategy are
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I y b y c p b brt2 0= ³ >{( , ); , *}  , (8)
where b*  is defined by P( ) .I Grt2 =  Reused resources under benefit targeting are
U y b y c p b bru2 0= ³ £{( , ); , *}  . (9)
Under benefit-cost targeting, there is a critical benefit-cost ratio, MB*, such that all utilized
resources with b p y c MB( ) *0 - >  will be preserved.  Thus, the retired resources under benefit-
cost targeting are
I y b y c p b MB p y crt3 0 0= ³ > -{( , ); , *( )}  , (10)
where MB* is defined by P( ) .I Grt3 =  The reused resources under this strategy are
U y b y c p b MB p y cru3 0 0= ³ £ -{( , ); , *( )}  . (11)
These three targeting strategies can be illustrated by using Figure 1.  The resources in con-
servation under these targeting strategies are I O H I J K1 = + + + + ,  I O J K L M2 = + + + + ,  and
I O I J L3 = + + + .  The resources in production under these strategies are U L M N1 = + + ,
U H I N2 = + +  and U H K M N3 = + + + .   The performance of these targeting strategies is
compared in proposition 1.
Proposition 1:  If the conservation fund has no effect on the output price, then
(i) Q I Q I Q I( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2³ ³ ,  (ii) Q U Q U Q U( ) ( ) ( ),1 3 2£ £
(iii) Y Y Y2 3 1³ ³ , (iv) PS PS PS1 2 3 0= = = P ,
(v) B B B3 1 2³ ,  .
Proof: From Figure 1, the difference in the number of resource units in conservation under
benefit targeting and benefit-cost targeting is
Q I Q I Q K M Q I( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 3- = + - . (12)
Because resources in K+M are more productive and therefore more expensive than re-
sources in I, a given budget can purchase more resources in I than in K+M.  Thus,
Q I Q I( ) ( ) .2 3 0- £ (13)
Under cost targeting, least expensive resources are purchased first.  As a result, more re-
sources will be purchased under cost targeting than under benefit or benefit-cost targeting.  This
result along with (13) implies the relationships in (i). Because I U Ri i+ =  is fixed, (i) implies (ii).
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To proveY Y Y2 3 1³ ³ ,  notice that the resources in production under the three targeting strate-
gies are U L M N1 = + + ,  U H I N2 = + +  and U H K M N3 = + + + .   Thus,
Y Y Y H I N Y H K M N Y I Y K M2 3- = + + - + + + = - +( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (14)
Y Y Y H K M N Y L M N Y H K Y L3 1- = + + + - + + = + -( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . (15)
To determine the sign of the difference, note that
P P( ) ( )I G Irt rt2 3= =   and   P P( ) ( )I G Irt rt3 1= = . (16)
By using (2), we obtain
p Y I cQ I p Y I cQ Irt rt rt rt0 2 2 0 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- = - , (17)
p Y I cQ I p Y I cQ Irt rt rt rt0 3 3 0 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- = - . (18)
Because Q I Q I Q Irt rt rt( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2³ ³ , we have
Y I Y Irt rt( ) ( )2 3£  and  Y I Y Irt rt( ) ( )3 1£ . (19)
Substituting I H I J Krt1 = + + + , I J K L Mrt2 = + + + , and I I J Lrt3 = + + into (19) gives
Y K M Y I( + ) ( )£  and  Y L Y H K( ) ( + )£ . (20)
Finally, by substituting (20) into (14) and (15), we obtain
Y Y Y2 3 1³ ³ . (21)
To compare profit and producer net returns under these targeting strategies, note that when
the output price is fixed resources that are profitable to use are the same under the three targeting
criteria.  Specifically, U I U y b y c pi
ru
i
rt+ = = ³0 0{( , ); }  for i =1, 2, 3.  Thus,
PS U I Ui i
ru
i
rt= + =P P( ) ( ).0 (22)
Because P Pi iPS M U M= - = -( ) ,0  total profit from production under the three targeting
strategies are also identical.
To prove B B3 1³ ,  note that
B B B I I B I I B I B Ilp rt lp rt rt rt3 1 0 3 0 1 3 1- = + - + = -( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). (23)
Substitute I H I J Krt1 = + + +  and I I J Lrt3 = + +  into (23),
B B B L B H K3 1- = - +( ) ( ). (24)
Under both the cost and benefit-cost targeting strategies, resources in I+J will be targeted for
conservation.  Thus, the same amount of money is left for purchasing resources in L under ben-
efit-cost targeting and for purchasing resources in H+K under cost targeting.  Because cost per
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unit of benefit is less in L than in H+K, a given budget can purchase more environmental benefits
from resource in L than from resources in H+K, implying that the right-hand side of (24) is
greater than zero.  Similarly, we can prove that
B B B I B I B I B K Ms s3 2 3 2 0- = - = - + ³( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . (25)
The difference between total benefits under cost and benefit targeting cannot be signed.  To
see why, note that
B B B H I B L M1 2- = + - +( ) ( ) . (26)
Although resources in I+H offer less benefit per unit than resources in L+M, resources in
I+H are less expensive than resources in L+M.  As a result, a given budget can purchase more
resource in H+I than in L+M. Q.E.D.
The differences in output, environmental benefits and the total amount of resource saved
under the three targeting strategies depend on the correlation between productivity and environ-
mental benefits.  When they are negatively correlated, resources that cost less are also more likely
to offer larger environmental benefits.  In this case, all three strategies are likely to target the
same resources.  For example, the differences in the amount of resources purchased and the total
output under benefit and cost targeting are
Q Q Q H I Q L Ms s1 2- = + - +( ) ( )      and      Y Y
c
p
Q L M Q H I1 2
0
- = + - +( ) ( ) . (27)
These differences would be relatively small when productivity and environmental benefits
are negatively correlated because there are fewer resource units in both H+I and L+M.  Intu-
itively, a negative correlation between b and y implies that, on average, resources that cost less
are also more likely to offer larger benefits.  As a result, cost targeting and benefit targeting are
more likely to target the same resources (resources in J+K).  On the other hand, when costs and
benefits are positively correlated, resources that cost less are also more likely to offer fewer
benefits.  As a result, most resources purchased under cost ranking will be in H+I, whereas most
resources purchased under benefit ranking will be in L+M.  Because resources in H+I are less
expensive than resources in L+M, more resources will be purchased under cost targeting than
under benefit targeting.  As a result, both differences in (27) are relatively large.
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Output and the amount of resource saved under benefit-cost targeting are between those
obtained under cost targeting and benefit targeting.  This suggests that total output and resource
saved under all three targeting criteria will be quite close when benefits and costs are negatively
correlated, and they will be quite different when benefits and costs are positively correlated.
Similarly, it can be shown that the differences in total environmental benefits achieved under the
three targeting criteria will be small when productivity and environmental benefits are negatively
correlated and large when they are positively correlated.
Proposition 1 suggests that environmentalists should prefer benefit-cost targeting because it
results in the largest environmental benefits. Groups that are interested in maintaining higher
production levels, such as labor, would prefer benefit targeting over benefit-cost targeting or cost
targeting because benefit targeting takes the smallest amount of resource out of production and
results in the highest output level.  Producers should be indifferent among the three targeting
strategies because total producer surplus does not change across the alternatives.
In the next three sections, we analyze the outcomes for the case of downward sloping de-
mand.  We first identify conditions under which the targeting strategies may be counterproductive
and then compare their economic, environmental, and distributional impacts.
Endogenous Output Price and Slippage
With a downward sloping demand curve, the conservation fund will increase the output
price as resources are diverted from production.  This increase in output price can cause two
types of “slippage”.  First, it becomes profitable to use some previously idle resources.  These
resources would be used in production if not purchased, reducing total environmental benefits.
On the other hand, if these resources are purchased, less money is available for purchasing other
resources.  Second, the increase in output price makes resources more valuable in production.  If
the resource owners anticipate this price increase, they will ask for higher selling prices.  As a
result, fewer resources can be purchased with a given budget.
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The amount of slippage can be quite significant.  For example, 16.76 million acres of crop-
land were retired under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in 14 major agricultural states
in U.S. Midwest by 1992, 10  but total cropland acres were reduced by only 5.3 million acres,
implying that 11.46 million acres of non-cropland was converted to cropland in the period.  Berck
and Bentley [5] estimate that governmental takings of old-growth redwood for inclusion in the
Redwood National Park have significantly increased the redwood price.  The 1978 taking alone
increased the redwood price by 26%.  Ironically, these price increases lead to increased profits
and the harvesting of more old-growth redwood on other lands.  In this section, we show that
slippage reduces the effectiveness of the conservation fund and, in some cases, may lead to lower
environmental quality.
To analyze the likelihood of the counterproductive outcome, define the benefit intensity of
resources in X, d ( ),X  as the ratio of average benefit to average output of resources in X, .
                  Counterproductive outcomes are likely to occur as the ratio of the benefit inten-
sity of the activated resources to the benefit intensity of the retired resources increases.  Denote
the elasticity of output demand as h = - ¢D p pY( )0
0
0
.  In most cases, inelastic demand increases the
likelihood of counterproductive outcomes.  Finally, denote the average profit per unit of output in
set X as ( )| / ( | )yE X p c E y Xp º -  and the change in output price under strategy i as
Dp p pi iº - 0 .
We consider two policy designs in response to slippage.  One is unrestricted targeting, where
targeting is not restricted to resources in production.  In this case, some of the previously idle
resources that become profitable to use are purchased.  The other is restricted targeting, where a
purchasing fund is designed to purchase only resources in production.  The CRP, for example,
targets only cropland currently in production.  In this case, some low quality resources that were
idle before will be utilized because of the price increase.  Thus, six policy scenarios are evaluated
below.
i. Unrestricted Cost Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 2a, where I a
rn
1
 is retained
resources, I Ia
rt
a
lp
1 1 and are retired and low productivity resources, and U a
ru
1
 is the reused resources.
Because all previously idle resources are either purchased or still unprofitable to use, there are no
E(b X)/E(y X).
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activated resources (i.e., U a
ac
1
 = 0).  The total environmental gain under the strategy is
DB B Ua art1 1= ( ) , which is positive except when output demand is perfectly inelastic.  With a
perfectly inelastic demand, the environmental gain will disappear, and the conservation fund is
fully transferred to owners of low-quality resources.
ii. Restricted Cost Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 2b.  In this case, some previ-
ously idle resources are activated because of the output price increase from p0  to p b1 .  Produc-
tion resources in I b
rt
1
are purchased, and previously idle resources in U b
ac
1
 are activated and used.
The net environmental gain is DB B I B Ub brt bac1 1 1= -( ) ( ) .
iii. Unrestricted Benefit Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 3a.  The introduction of
the purchasing fund raises output price to p a2 .  Previously idle resources in U a
ac
2
 are activated,
while previously idle resources in I a
rn
2
 are purchased.  Previously used resources in I a
rt
2
are pur-
chased.  The net environmental gain under this targeting strategy is DB B I B Ua art aac2 2 2= -( ) ( ) .
iv. Restricted Benefit Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 3b.  When benefit targeting
only purchases previously utilized resources ( I b
rt
2
), some of the low productivity resources (U b
ac
2
)
will be activated because of the output price increase.  The net environmental gain under this
targeting strategy is DB B I B Ub brt bac2 2 2= -( ) ( ) .
v. Unrestricted Benefit-Cost Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 4a.  The previously
utilized resources in I a
rt
3
 are retired, previously idle resources in I a
rt
3
 are retained, and previously
idle resources in U a
ac
3
 are activated.  The net environmental gain is DB B I B Ua art aac3 3 3= -( ) ( ) .
vi. Restricted Benefit-Cost Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 4b, where resources in
I b
rt
3
 are retired, and resources in U b
ac
3
 are activated.  The net environmental gain is
DB B I B Ub brt bac3 3 3= -( ) ( ) .
As output demand becomes more inelastic, slippage tends to increase.  In some cases, the
introduction of purchasing fund may be counterproductive from an environmental perspective.
Proposition 2: All restricted targeting criteria and unrestricted benefit targeting may reduce
environmental quality.  The conditions for the counterproductive outcome are
DB b1 0£  iff  
( )1 0 11 1
1 1 0
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
rtrt ac
b y bb b
ac rt
b b
p Y E II Y U
U Y I p M
pd h
d
D
£ = - , (28)
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DB a2 0£  iff
( )
( )
2 0 22 2
2 2 0 2 2
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]
rtrt ac
a y aa a
ac rt rn rt
a a a y a
p Y E II Y U
U Y I p M Y I E I
pd h
d p
D
£ = -
-
, (29)
DB b2 0£  iff
( )2 0 22 2
2 2 0
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
rtrt ac
b y bb b
ac rt
b b
p Y E II Y U
U Y I p M
pd h
d
D
£ = - , (30)
DB b3 0£ iff
( )3 0 33 3
3 3 0
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( )
rtrt ac
b y bb b
ac rt
b b
p Y E II Y U
U Y I p M
pd h
d
D
£ = - . (31)
Proof: First, we prove (28).  By definition,
Y Y I U D pb
rt
b
ru
0 1 1 0= + =( ) ( ) , (32)
Y Y U U D pb b
ac
b
ru
b1 1 1 1= + =( ) ( ) . (33)
The difference between (32) and (33) is
Y I Y U D p D p D p p p
p Y
pb
rt
b
ac
b b
b( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0
0
- = - @ ¢ - = h D . (34)
Also the budget constraint implies
( )1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )rt rt rt rtb b b y bM pY I cQ I Y I E Ip= - = , (35)
( )1 1( )rt rtb y bY I M E Ip= . (36)
Divide (34) by (36) and then rearrange terms,
( )1 0 11
1 0
( )
1
( )
rtac
b y bb
rt
b
p Y E IY U
Y I p M
p
h
D
= - . (37)
By definition,
DB B I B U I Y I U Y Ub brt bac brt brt bac bac1 1 1 1 1 1 1= - = -( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d d . (38)
Thus, DB1b £0  if and only ifd
d
( )
( )
( )
( )
I
U
Y U
Y I
b
rt
b
ac
b
ac
b
rt
1
1
1
1
£ . (39)
Substituting (37) into (39) gives (28).  The proofs of conditions (29)-(31) are similar
and omitted. Q.E.D.
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Proposition 2 demonstrates that counterproductive outcome may occur under all restricted
targeting criteria, and under unrestricted benefit targeting.  Restricted cost targeting will result in
a counterproductive environmental outcome under condition (28).  The LHS of (28) is the ratio of
the benefit intensity of the retired resources ( I b
rt
1  in Figure 2b) to the activated resources (U b
ac
1 ).
The RHS of (28) is the ratio of the output of the activated resources to the output of the retired
resources.  The purchasing fund will reduce environmental quality if the aggregate benefits of
activated resources are greater than the aggregate benefits of the retired resources.  The retired
resources produce more output than the activated resources (output price increases with the
purchasing fund).  Condition (28) shows that if the purchasing fund has a counterproductive
effect, the benefit to output ratio of activated resources must be larger than the benefit to output
ratio of retired resources ( i.e., d d( ) ( )U Ibac brt1 1> ).
To satisfy condition (28), environmental benefits must be negatively correlated with produc-
tivity.  This happens, for example, when most resources are concentrated along line bc in figure
2b.  But the negative correlation between y and b is only a necessary condition since it guarantees
the LHS of (28) is less than one.  For counterproductive outcome to occur, the output demand has
to be sufficiently inelastic so that the RHS of (28) is larger than the LHS of (28).
Unrestricted benefit targeting will result in counterproductive outcome under condition (29).
This condition suggests that the smaller the ratio of the benefit intensity of retired resources ( I a
rt
2
in Figure 3a) to the activated resources (U a
ac
2 ), the more likely the counterproductive outcome to
occurs.  The counterproductive effect will not happen when benefits and productivity are nega-
tively correlated and LHS > 1.  The RHS of (29) is the ratio of the output of the activated re-
sources to the output of the retired resources.  The counterproductive effect is more likely as the
RHS is closer to one, which occurs when the output demand is inelastic (h  is small).
With unrestricted benefit targeting, much of the money will be spent to purchase high
productivity resources in I a
rt
2  in Figure 3a.  Significant price increases (for small h ) will activate
low productivity resources in U a
ac
2 .  More resources may be activated than retired (even though
activated resources produce less output).  If productivity has a much larger variation than envi-
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ronmental benefits, and environmental benefits are positively correlated with productivity (for
example, when most resources are concentrated along line ab in Figure 3a), then the purchasing
fund may be counterproductive.
Restricted benefit targeting will result in a counterproductive environmental outcome under
condition (30).  This condition is likely to hold when (a) output demand is quite inelastic, (b)
environmental benefits and productivity are negatively correlated, and/or (c) the variation in
productivity is much larger than the environmental benefits.  Under (a), h is very small and the
right-hand side of (30) is close to one.  Unlike the case of unrestricted benefit targeting, negative
correlation between y and b will increase the likelihood of counterproductive effect of restrictive
benefit targeting.  Under the negative correlation (for example, when resources are concentrated
along cb in Figure 3b), the resource intensity of activated resources is greater than that of the
retired sources, and the LHS of (30) is more likely to be less than one. When variation of produc-
tivity is large, much of the budget will be spent on purchasing some highly productive resources
under benefit targeting.  Thus, as output price increases, more resources may be activated than
retired.  Condition (c) is especially important if the correlation is positive because it makes the
LHS of (30) smaller (for example, when resources are concentrated along ab).  In this case, when
environmental benefits do not vary greatly, the environmental loss from activating low productiv-
ity resources may be greater than the gains from preserving previously utilized ones.
Restricted benefit-cost targeting will result in a counterproductive environmental outcome
under condition (31).  The LHS of (31) is the ratio of the benefit intensity of the retired resources
to the benefit intensity of the activated resources.  It is likely to be less than one if the correlation
between b and y is negative (for example, when most resources are concentrated along cd in
figure 4b).  As in previous cases, the negative correlation is not sufficient to cause the counterpro-
ductive effect.  It also requires relatively inelastic demand.
Proposition 3: The environmental effects of unrestricted cost targeting and benefit-cost
targeting are always nonnegative, i.e.,
DB I M
E Ia
a
rt
y a
rt1
1
1
0= ³d p
( )
( )
, (40)
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3 3 0
3 3 3
3 0 3
( )( ) ( ) 1 0
( ) ( )
rt
rt rt a a
a a a ac rt
a a
I p YB Y I U
U pY I
d hd
d
é ùDD = + - ³ê ú
ë û
. (41)
Proof:  Condition (40) follows from DB I Y Ia art art1 1 1= d ( ) ( ) and M E I Y Iy art art= ( ) ( )p 1 1 .  For
unrestricted benefit-cost targeting, Y I Y U D p D p
p Y
pa
rt
a
ac
a
a( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 0 3
3 0
0
- = - @h D .  Divide both
sides of this equation by Y I a
rt( )3  and rearrange terms,
Y U
Y I
p Y
p Y I
a
ac
a
rt
a
a
rt
( )
( ) ( )
3
3
3 0
0 3
1= - h D . (42)
By definition,
3 3
3 3 3 3 3
3 3
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
rt ac
rt ac rt ac a a
a a a a a ac rt
a a
I Y U
B B I B U Y I U
U Y I
dd
d
é ùD = - = -ê ú
ë û
. (43)
Substituting (42) into (43) gives (41).  Because d d( ) ( )I Uart aac3 3³ , (42) and (43) together
imply DB a3 0³ . Q.E.D.
Expession (40) suggests that the total environmental benefit achieved under unrestricted cost
targeting depends on the budget, the benefit intensity of the retired resources, and the demand
elasticity.  The per-unit cost of the retired resources increases as demand gets more inelastic,
reducing the amount of resources that can be purchased with a given budget.  Figure 4a provides
the intuition for expression (41).  Clearly, all points in I a
rt
3  are above oc, whereas all points in U a
ac
3
are below this line.  Thus, the benefit intensity of the activated resources in U a
ac
3  is lower than the
benefit intensity of the retired resources in I a
rt
3 .
In summary, the results of this section suggest that slippage reduces the effectiveness of
conservation funds and, sometimes, may lead to counterproductive environmental outcomes.  In
the next section, we show that because of slippage, cost-benefit targeting is no longer maximizing
total environmental benefit for a given budget.
Benefit-maximizing Targeting Strategies
When output demand is perfectly elastic, cost-benefit targeting maximizes total environmen-
tal benefit for a given budget.  This result does not hold for inelastic output demand, however.
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Proposition 4: If output demand is not perfectly elastic, then total environmental benefits
will be maximized for a given budget if resources are ranked and purchased from high to low
according to
( ) 41
b
p y cr+ - ,
where r > 0 if h < ¥  and r = 0  if h = ¥ .  This benefit-maximizing targeting criterion puts a
larger weight on output than benefit-cost targeting:
p p p4 3 41£ £ +( )r .
Proof: See the Appendix.  Proposition 4 shows that only when output demand is perfectly
elastic ( i.e, h = ¥  and r = 0 ), does benefit-cost targeting maximize total environmental benefit.
When demand is not perfectly elastic, the price feedback must be considered in designing target-
ing criteria to maximize total environmental benefits.  Specifically, output price must be adjusted
by (1 + r ) when the benefit-cost ratio is calculated.  This adjustment will effectively put a larger
weight on output and a relatively smaller weight on environmental benefits than benefit-cost
targeting when deciding which resources to purchase.  This adjustment aims to reduce the price
feedback effect associated with inelastic demand, and is done by reducing purchase of output
below the level under benefit-cost targeting.  Specifically, total output will be reduced by a
smaller amount if more high-benefit and high-output resources are purchased.  For example,
suppose there are two types of resources.  Each unit of type-1 resource produces two units of
output and three units of environmental benefits, and each unit type-2 resources produces one
unit of output and one unit of environmental benefits.  Suppose output price is one dollar and the
production cost per unit of resource is 50 cents.  Then profit per unit of resource would  be $1.5
for type-1 resources and $0.5 for type-two resources.  The benefit-cost ratio is 2 for both types of
resource.  If the output price is fixed, it does not matter which type of resource you purchase
because you will receive the same amount of environmental benefit.  However, if the output
demand is highly inelastic, one would prefer to purchase the high-output high-benefit resource
because the total output would be reduced by a small amount and, as a result, the slippage would
be smaller.  For example, a budget of $15 would allow you to purchase 10 units of type-1 re-
sources, which would reduce output by 20 units, or 30 units of type-2 resources, which would
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reduce the total output by 30 units.  This example illustrates that slippage would make the high-
benefit high-output units relatively more attractive.
The effect of inelastic demand on targeting is illustrated in Figure 5.  Under benefit maximi-
zation, resources are ranked and purchased according to b p c[( ) ]1 4+ -r , and resources in areas
A and E are purchased.  Under benefit-cost targeting, resources are ranked and purchased accord-
ing to b p y c( )3 - , and resources in areas H, E, and D are purchased.  By purchasing resources in
area H instead of resources in area A, benefit-cost targeting causes a greater price increase.  As a
result, it has to purchase resources in area D, which would otherwise enter into production.  It
also has to pay a higher price for resources in area E.  In addition, it causes more slippage than
benefit-maximizing targeting by area C.  This suggests that benefit-cost targeting spend too much
money on low-output and low-benefit resources and too little money on high-output and high
benefit resources.
The purchasing fund agency is in essence acting like a monoposonist.  It realizes that it can
affect the price of resources it purchases and, therefore, will modify its purchasing strategy to
reduce the opportunity cost of benefit release.  By purchasing more high-benefit and high-output
resources than benefit-cost targeting, the agency can reduce the output price increase, which will
reduces the purchasing cost and slippage.
 As output demand becomes increasingly inelastic, more and more high-benefit and high-
output resources will be purchased in order to reduce the slippage.  Graphically, the line
b p c[( ) ]1 4 4+ - =r l  becomes flatter and benefit-maximizing targeting becomes more like
benefit targeting.  However, it will not become equivalent to benefit targeting as the demand
elasticityhc  approaches zero because r  approaches a positive number which is less than infinite
(see the definition of r  in the Appendix).  On the other hand, as output demand becomes increas-
ingly elastic, more and more low-benefit and low-output resources will be targeted for conserva-
tion under benefit-maximizing targeting.  Slippage will disappear and benefit-maximizing target-
ing becomes identical to benefit-cost targeting as the demand elasticity approaches infinity and r
approaches zero.
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The relative efficiency of benefit-cost targeting and benefit-maximizing targeting is illus-
trated in figure 6.  Previous studies ([4, pp. 36-55; 11]) suggest that benefit-cost targeting maxi-
mizes total environmental benefit for a given level of market surplus (i.e., the sum of consumer,
producer and government surpluses).  However, a fund manager is often subject to a budget
constraint instead of a market-surplus constraint.  By switching from benefit-cost targeting to
benefit-maximizing targeting, the fund manager would be able to achieve a higher level of envi-
ronmental benefit, but with the loss of market surplus as a cost.  Graphically, the manager moves
from a to b in Figure 6a or from a’ to b’ in Figure 6b, trading market surplus for environmental
benefits.  The value of the additional environmental benefits is smaller than the loss of market
surplus, resulting in a net social loss (point b is located inside the frontier curve).  The fund
manager cannot move along the frontier curve because of the budget constraint.  To achieve the
level of environmental benefit BB M  by using benefit-cost targeting, the fund manager would
need a larger budget ( ¢G ).   By using benefit-maximizing targeting, the manager can “stretch”
the purchasing power of the budget by reducing the increase in the output price through purchas-
ing some high-benefit and high-output resources.
Comparing Targeting Strategies: Inelastic Output Demand
This section compares the economic, environmental, and distributional effects of the four
targeting strategies for the case of downward sloping output demand.  The analysis focuses on
only unrestricted targeting criteria because they are less likely to cause counterproductive envi-
ronmental outcomes.
Proposition 5:  If the distribution function  is continuous in y and b and targeting is unre-
stricted, then
 (i) Y Y Y Y2 4 3 1³ ³ ³ , (ii) p p p p1 3 4 2³ ³ ³ ,
(iii) CS CS CS CS2 4 3 1³ ³ ³ , (iv) PS PS PS PS1 3 4 2³ ³ ³ ,
 (v) Q U Q U Q U Q U( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 4 3 1³ ³ ³ , (vi) Q I Q I Q I Q I( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3 4 2³ ³ ³ ,
(vii) B B B4 3 1³ ³ , B B4 2³
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Proof: We prove first that .  According to proposition 1, this result holds when the output
demand is perfectly elastic.  So, we only need to prove that the result also holds when the output
demand is not perfectly elastic.  We prove the result by negation.  Consider a continuum of
demand curves that vary with one parameter (j ).  An increase in j  increases the price elasticity
at all points along the demand curve.  Because the distribution function  is continuous, output
levels under the targeting criteria are also continuous functions of j .  Suppose Y Y2 3<  when
demand is highly inelastic (small j ). Then there must be a more elastic demand curve (with
higher j ) such that  and.   implies
E y U Q U E yU Q U( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 3 3= , (44)
where E yUi( )  is the average output per unit of resource in Ui .  Because
I I U I I Urt rn rt rn2 2 2 3 3 3+ + = + +  (see Figures 3a and 4a).  Thus,
     E y I I Q I I E yU Q U
rt rn rt rn( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 2+ + +   = + + +E y I I Q I I E yU Q U
rt rn rt rn( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 3 3 3 3 . (45)
Equation (44) and equation (45) together imply
E y I I Q I I E y I I Q I Irt rn rt rn rt rn rt rn( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3+ + = + + . (46)
The budget constraint implies that
p E y I I c Q I I p E y I I c Q I Irt rn rt rn rt rn rt rn2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ - + = + - + . (47)
Because , equations (46) and (47) together imply
Q I I Q I Irt rn rt rn( ) ( )2 2 3 3+ = + ,                                                                  (48)
which cannot hold because the same amount of money is spent on resources in I Irt rn2 2+  and
I Irt rn3 3+ , and resources in I Irt rn3 3+ , on average, cost less than resources in I Irt rn2 2+ .  This sug-
gests that Y Y2 3³  and must always hold.  Similarly, we can prove that Y Y2 4³  and Y Y3 1³ .  These
results together with Y Y4 3³  from proposition 4 establish the relationships in (i) and (ii).
To prove results in (iii), note that by definition,
(49)
Differentiate  with respect to ,
( )1
0.ii i
i i
D YCS Y
Y Y
¶¶
¶ ¶
-
= - > (50)
1 1
0
( ) ( ) .
Yi
i i iCS D d D Y Yd d- -= -ò
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Because Y Y Y Y2 4 3 1³ ³ ³ ,  we get
CS CS CS CS2 4 3 1³ ³ ³ . (51)
Producer surplus equals the sum of production profit and payments from the conservation
fund:
0
( ) ( ) ( , )
i
yb
ru rt rn
i i i i i i
c p
PS M U I I p y c s y b dydb= P + = P + + = -òò . (52)
Differentiating  with respect to  gives
0
( , ) ( ) 0
i
yb
li
i
i c p
PS ys y b dydb Y R I
p
¶
¶
= = - >òò . (53)
Because p p p p1 3 4 2³ ³ ³ ,  (53) implies PS PS PS PS1 3 4 2³ ³ ³ .  Higher output prices
increase profit of utilized resources (intensive-margin effect) and profitable resource base (exten-
sive-margin effect).  Resource owners will benefit from a higher price whether they use the
resources in production or sell them to the conservation fund.
Now, we prove .  implies that
3 3 1 1( ) ( ) ( ( ),E y U Q U E y U Q U| ³ | , (54)
Graphically, U C I1 = +  and U D I3 = +  in figure 7a.  Since E y U E yU( ) ( )3 1< , expression
(54) implies 3 1( ) ( )Q U Q U³ .
To prove 2 3( ) ( )Q U Q U³ , we need to prove Q E Q C H( ) ( )³ +  in figure 7b because
U E I2 = +  and U C H I3 = + + .  Note that Y Y3 2£  implies that Y C H Y E( ) ( )+ £ . Sup-
pose Q E Q C H( ) ( )< + , then
p Y E cQ E p Y C H cQ C H p Y C cQ C p Y C cQ C3 3 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- > + - + > - > - .   (55)
This suggests that less money is spent on resources in C under benefit targeting than on
resources in E under benefit-cost targeting, which cannot be because benefit-cost targeting must
purchase resources in F and pay a higher price for resources in D, while benefit targeting spends
all money on resources in D and C.  Thus, the relationship 2 3( ) ( )Q U Q U³  must always hold.
Similarly, we can prove that Q U Q U( ) ( )2 4³ .
To prove Q U Q U( ) ( )4 3³ , we need to prove Q H Q C A( ) ( )³ +  in figure 5 because
U H F4 = +  and U A C F3 = + + .  Note that Y Y3 4£  implies that Y C A Y H( ) ( )+ £ . Suppose
Q H Q C A( ) ( )< + , then
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p Y H cQ H p Y C A cQ C A p Y A cQ A p Y A cQ A3 3 3 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- > + - + > - > - .  (56)
This suggests that less money is spent on resources in A under benefit maximization than on
resources in H under benefit-cost targeting, which cannot be true because benefit-cost targeting
must purchase resources in D and pay a higher price for resources in E.  Thus, the relation-
ship Q U Q U( ) ( )4 3³  must hold.  This result together with Q U Q U( ) ( )2 4³  and
Q U Q U Q U( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2£ £  implies (v).  Because Q U Q I Q Ri i( ) ( ) ( )+ =  is a constant, expression (v)
implies (vi).
Now, we prove (vii).  By definition, B Bi4 ³  for i = 1, 2, 3.  To prove B B3 1³ , we use figure
7a.  The difference in total environmental benefits for cost targeting and benefit-cost targeting is
B B B D B C1 3- = -( ) ( ) . (57)
The fund purchases resources in area (D+E+F) under cost targeting and resources in area
(C+E) under benefit-cost targeting.  Because the price is higher under cost targeting, more money
is spent on resources in area C than in area D.  Also, because the benefit-cost ratio of resources in
C is higher than the benefit-cost ratio of resources in D, more benefits would be purchased in C
than in D. Thus, B B1 3 0- < . Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 suggests that benefit targeting results in the largest amount of resource used in
production and the smallest amount of resource in conservation.  As a result, the output is highest
and the output price is lowest under benefit targeting. Consumers who do not care the environment
should prefer benefit targeting to the other strategies because consumer surplus is highest under this
targeting strategy.  Other groups that may support benefit targeting are labor and input suppliers
because this strategy has the smallest impact on production.  Benefit targeting should be the least
preferred strategy of the resource owners because it results in the lowest producer surplus.
With cost targeting, more resources are diverted from production than the other strategies,
resulting in the largest reduction in output and the largest price increase.  Cost targeting also
results in the largest increase in producer surplus because resource owners receive the highest
prices and have the lowest production cost (the number of resources utilized under this strategy is
smallest).  Essentially, cost targeting is most preferred by resource owners because it is most
28 / Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock
effective in reducing supply and enables them to take advantage of market power.  Indeed, the
Conservation Reserve Program that aims to provide environmental benefit and farm income
supports used cost targeting before 1992.
When the output price is fixed, benefit-cost targeting maximizes total environmental benefit
for a given budget.  It is also efficient because it maximizes total environmental benefit for a given
level of market surplus.  However, when the output demand is not perfectly elastic, benefit-cost
targeting no longer maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget.  To maximize total
environmental benefits, the price feedback must be considered in designing targeting criteria.
Specifically, output must be given a larger weight than in the case of benefit-cost targeting when
deciding which resources to purchase.  Without this adjustment, benefit-cost targeting may even
provide few environmental benefits than benefit targeting.  Indeed, when the output demand is not
perfectly elastic, benefit-cost targeting should not be the most preferred strategy of any group.
Conclusions
New efforts aimed at increasing environment quality have led to establishment of funds to
purchase environmental goods and to conserve natural resources.  These funds use various pur-
chasing strategies, the choice of which may lead to striking differences in environmental perfor-
mance.  This paper develops an analytical framework that recognizes spatial heterogeneity of
resources in providing output and environmental benefits.  We show that the performance of a
purchasing strategy depends on the variability of and correlation between productivity and envi-
ronmental benefits of resources.
We demonstrate that ignoring the output price effect of purchasing funds may have severe
consequences.  A purchasing fund should foresee the possible activation of previously idle re-
sources as a result of output price increase, and purchase some of these idle resources.  Limiting
purchasing only to resources currently in production, as the CRP has been implemented, may
reduce environmental gain from the purchasing fund and, in some cases, may make a purchasing
fund counterproductive.
A purchasing strategy that targets resources with the highest environmental benefits may be
counterproductive even if the possibility of slippage is recognized.  This strategy, however, will
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have the smallest impact on output price and overall resource use among all strategies considered
and should be favored by consumers and input providers.  A strategy that targets low-cost re-
sources will result in the largest reduction in production and the largest output price increase, and
should be favored by resource owners.  A strategy that targets resources with the highest benefit-
to-cost ratio is efficient and provides more environmental benefits than cost or benefit targeting
when the output price is fixed.  However, when the output demand is inelastic, benefit-cost
targeting is neither efficient nor maximizing total environmental benefit for a given budget.  This
criterion tends to target too many units of low-benefit and low-cost resources.
Figures
Figure 1. A comparison of alternative targeting strategies for fixed output price
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Figure 2. Unrestricted vs. restricted cost targeting
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Figure 3. Unrestricted vs. restricted benefit tarteging
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Figure 4. Unrestricted vs. restricted cost-benefit targeting
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Figure 5. Benefit-cost targeting vs. benefit-maximizing targeting
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Figure 6. The relative efficiency of benefit-cost targeting vs. benefit-mzsimizing targeting
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Figure 7. A comparison of alternative targeting criteria for inelastic output demand
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Figure 8. A comparison of alternative targeting criteria for inelastic output demand
Endnotes
1. The terms purchasing funds and conservation funds are used synonymously in this study.
2.  Two U.S. Department of Agriculture programs, the Conservation Reserve Program and the
Environmental Quality Incentive Program, have an explicitly stated objective of maximizing
the quantity of environmental benefit per dollar expended.
3. The competing public choice view of government maintains that government develops
policies in response to special interest groups’ demands [19]. The special interest groups
attempt to seek rents through influencing government policies, and the government’s objec-
tive is to maximize political support from interest groups receiving rents.
4. There is significant evidence to support the assumption of fixed coefficient technology at the
micro level.  Studies show that the von Liebig production function (which assumes fixed
coefficient technology) is very effective in explaining yields of agricultural crops [6, 15, 17].
5.  There have been significant efforts at addressing issues of asymmetric information and
uncertainty in bidding for resources [8, 10, 23].
6. Babcock, et al. [2, 3] applied this framework for redesigning the Conservation Reserve
Program.  Sunding et al. [20] used it to assess the economic and environmental impact of
alternative designs of the Central Valley Improvement Act in California.
7. Even if the optimal budget can be determined, the use of conservation funds to purchase
resources out of production may not be the best way to achieve the optimal resource alloca-
tion when conservation funds are raised through taxation.  There are deadweight losses
associated with taxation due to both administrative costs of tax collection and economic
costs of market distortions [1, 9].
8. Any plus sign in set operations represents union, i.e., .
9.  Based on the definition of  and properties of integration, for any , ,   Thus, if , then  The
same properties hold for functions .
10. The 14 states include those in the Corn Belt (Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri), Lake
States (Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota), Northern Plains (North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas), and Southern Plains (Oklahoma and Taxes).  The estimate is based on
the 1982, 1987 and 1992 National Resources Inventory conducted by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
Appendix
Proof:   Let r y b( , ) be the share of resources with (y,b) that is used in production after the
establishment of the conservation fund. r y b( , ) = 0 if py c- < 0 .  Thus, the resource in conserva-
tion is { }( , ) |  0 ,R y b b b c p y y- £ £ £ £ , and the total environmental benefit is
0 0 0
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
y yb b
c p
B bs y b dydb br y b s y b dydb= -òò òò . (A1)
The total output and total units of resource in production are
( ) ( )
0
, ,
yb
c
c p
Y yr y b s y b dydb= òò   and   ( ) ( )
0
, ,
yb
c p
Q r y b s y b dydb= òò . (A2)
Under the full information assumption, the total program cost is
( ) ( )
0
( )[1 , ] ,
yb
c p
G py c r y b s y b dydbº - -òò , (A3)
where p D Yc= - 1( ) is the inverse demand function.
Suppose the objective of the fund manager is to maximize total environmental benefit.
Then the relevant optimization problem for the fund manager is
Max B
r y b( , )
   ,  (A4)
s.t. G G£ , 0 1£ £r y b( , ) , D p Yc( ) = , (A5)
where B, G, and Yc  are defined by (A1) through (A3).  The equilibrium condition D p Yc( ) =
implicitly defines the output price as a function of the purchasing strategy.  We denote the func-
tion by ( )( , )p h r y b= .  For any given (y, b), differentiating both sides of D p Yc( ) =  with respect
to r(y, b), we obtain
2
3
0
( ) , ,
( , ) ( , )
bp c c c pD p y r b s b db
r y b p p p r y b
¶ ¶
¶ ¶
æ ö æ ö¢ = + ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è øò .
Solving for ¶ ¶p r y b( , ) gives,
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¶
¶ h
p
r y b
p y
p Y c Erc c c p( , )
= - +
3
2 2
, (A6)
where Y D pc = ( )4 , hc  is the demand elasticity evaluated at Yc , and Erc p is the percent of re-
sources with output level (c/p) that are not purchased by the fund.  By substituting ( )( , )p h r y b=
into B and G, the Lagrangian for the maximization problem defined by (A4) and (A5) can be
simply written as
0 0
( ) [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )(1 ( , ))]
yb
L B G G y b r y b y b r y b dydbg a b= + - + + -òò , (A7)
where g  is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constrain, and  and  are the Lagrange multipli-
ers for the constraints of 0 1£ £r y b( , ) .  By differentiating (A7) with respect to r y b( , )  for any
given (y, b), we obtain the first-order condition for the maximization problem:
 ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
L B B p G G p y b y b
r y b r y b p r y b r y b p r y b
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶g a b
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
é ù= + - + + -ê úë û
(A8)
       
( , ) ( , ) 0
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
B G B G p y b y b
r y b r y b p p r y b
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶g g a b
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
é ù= - + - + - =ê úë û
.
Substitute (A1), (A3) and (A6) into (A8),
3
4
4 /2 2 2
4 4
( )
( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0c p
c c c p
c p y
b p y c Eb Y y b y b
p p Y c Er
g g a b
h
é ù -- + - + - - D + - =ê ú +ë û
, or    (A9)
- + + - + - =b p y c y b y bg r a b( ) ) ( , ) ( , )1 04 , (A10)
where ( )2 2 24 4( )c p c c c pp Y cEb p Y c Err g g hé ù= D + +ë û, p4  is the equilibrium output price under the
benefit maximization, DY  is output that would be produced by the preserved resources, g is the
marginal environmental benefit of conservation fund, and Ebc p  is the average benefit per unit of
resources with output level (c/p) that are not purchased by the fund.  The Lagrangian multiplier
and  satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
r y b y b( , ) ( , )× =a 0    and   1 0- × =r y b y b( , ) ( , ) .b (A11)
Thus, if the resource with (y, b) is purchased (i.e. r y b( , ) = 0 ), .  From (A10) we get
( ) 41 0b p y cg r- + + - £é ùë û      or (A12)
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( ) 41
b
p y c
g
r
³
+ - . (A13)
Now, prove that p p p4 3 41£ £ +( )r .  First, we prove that p4  cannot be greater than p3 .
Suppose p p4 3> , then ( )1 4 3+ >r p p .  In this case, we have either figure 8a or figure 8b.  How-
ever, both figures are false.  Figure 8b is false because it implies that benefit-maximizing target-
ing produces less total benefit than benefit-cost targeting.  Under benefit-cost targeting, resources
in D are used in production, while under benefit maximization, resources in D+A+C are used in
production.  To show that p p4 3>  cannot hold in figure 8a, note that under the cost-benefit
targeting, resources in area (E+C) are purchased, while under the benefit maximization, resources
in area (A+C+D) are purchased.  Because resources in C cost more under the benefit maximiza-
tion, less money must be spent on resources in A than in E.  Also, because the average benefit-
cost ratio is higher in E than in A, i.e.,
3 3 4
b b b
E E E A E A
p y c p y c p y c
æ ö æ ö æ ö
> ³ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷- - -è øè ø è ø
. (A14)
The resources in A must provide few benefits than resources in E, which contradicts the
result that benefit-maximizing targeting maximizes total environmental benefit.  Thus, p4 cannot
be greater than p3 .
To prove that p p4 31( )+ ³r , we need to show that figure 8c and figure 8d cannot hold.
Clearly, figure figure 8d cannot hold because it implies that total output is lower under the benefit
maximization than under the benefit targeting, which contradicts the result that p p4 3£ .  To show
that figure 8c is also false, note that under the benefit maximization, resources in area (H+C) are
purchased, while under benefit-cost targeting, resources in area (A+C+D+F) are purchased.
Because p p4 3£ , less money must be spent in area A than in area H, i.e.,
p Y A cQ A p Y H cQ H p Y H cQ H3 3( ) ( ) * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- £ - £ - . (A15)
Also, because the total output is higher under benefit maximization than under benefit-cost
targeting, Y A Y H E I Y H( ) ( ) ( )³ + + > .  This, together with (A15) implies that Q A Q H( ) ( )> ,
which cannot hold because resources in A are more expensive and less money is spent on re-
sources in A.  Thus, figure 8c is also false and it must be true that p p4 31( )+ ³r .
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